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onstitutional democracy protects individual liberty. It does so by
placing restraints on the arbitrary exercise of power by government.
A primary restraint is the constitutional protection of property rights.
The monetary arrangements of a country either promote or undermine that
protection.
Money is unique in that its value in exchange far exceeds the cost of
producing an additional unit. On the one hand, governments have an incentive
to print additional money to gain “free” resources, or seigniorage revenues.1 On
the other hand, the central bank must limit the quantity of money in circulation
to control prices.
Through its inﬂuence on seigniorage, money creation affects how govern-
ment raises revenue. It can also affect who within government decides how that
revenue is spent. Through its inﬂuence on ﬂuctuations in the price level, money
creation inﬂuences the extent of arbitrary redistributions of wealth among
individuals. The institutional arrangements that govern the creation of money
then bear on two aspects of the protection of property rights: the taking and
disposition of wealth from the public and the distribution of wealth by govern-
ment between individuals.
The opinions expressed herein are the author’s and do not necessarily represent those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.
1 Under a commodity standard, the Mint had a monopoly over coinage. It charged a fee
called seigniorage for turning bullion into coins. Today, seigniorage is the general term for the
revenues a government gains from its monopoly over the creation of ﬁat money. The resources
commanded by a paper dollar (or its electronic equivalent bank reserves) far exceed the resources
needed to create that dollar. The central bank varies the amount of revenue it raises for the
government through seigniorage by varying the rate of money creation and, consequently, the
rate of inﬂation. Up to a point, higher inﬂation yields more revenue. When a central bank allows
high rates of money growth and inﬂation, seigniorage is commonly referred to as an “inﬂation
tax.” The holders of cash, who must add to their cash balances to restore the purchasing power
eroded by inﬂation, pay this tax.
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A legislative mandate from Congress requiring the Federal Reserve (the
Fed) to stabilize the price level and to hold only government securities in its
portfolio would complement the rules in a constitutional democracy that protect
property rights.
A Financial Times (1990) editorial made the case for rules in the conduct
of monetary policy:2
The notion that money must fall within the domain of day-to-day politics is a
20th century heresy. . . . Painful experience with the modern manipulation of
monetary policy suggests that money is more appropriately an element of the
constitutional framework of democracy than an object of the political struggle.
Monetary stability is a necessary condition for a working market economy,
which is itself a basis for a stable democracy.
1. OVERVIEW
Sections 2 and 3 provide historical background showing that monetary arrange-
ments in Britain and the United States have in the past raised issues basic to
the design of a constitutional democracy. Early British experience inﬂuenced
American thinking during the Revolutionary War, in which protection of prop-
erty rights was a central issue. Section 3 reviews how during the period of
the Articles of Confederation the states’ discretionary control of money under-
mined property rights. The monetary abuses of this period contributed to the
convening of the Constitutional Convention.
Section 4 reviews the more recent experience with discretionary control
of inﬂation in the 1970s and argues that this experience produced the same
arbitrary redistributions of wealth that characterized the earlier period. The
earlier experience led the Founding Fathers to remove government discretion
over money creation by putting the United States on a specie (gold or silver)
standard. The later experience caused the Fed in practice to assign priority to
maintaining a low rate of inﬂation. However, in this more recent period, the
United States has not put in place institutional arrangements to ensure mone-
tary stability in the future. Section 5 reviews ﬁscal transfers by the Fed made
possible through seigniorage and discusses how they can circumvent the con-
stitutionally mandated budget process. Section 6 offers concluding comments.
2. PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
The following historical review provides examples of how monetary arrange-
ments either reinforce or relax constitutional constraints on the exercise of
power by government. Discretionary control over inﬂation can undermine the
2 For an economic argument in favor of rules, see Friedman (1960) and Lucas (1983). For
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accountability provided for in a constitutional democracy. The power of a gov-
ernment to increase the revenue from seigniorage through inﬂation without
explicit legislation lessens democratic accountability. Moreover, the ability to
allocate seigniorage revenues discretionarily, that is, outside the constitutionally
mandated budget process, lessens accountability.
British Constitutional Democracy
The germ of constitutional democracy appeared in 1215 when British nobles
forced King John to sign the Magna Carta. The Magna Carta established the
principle that no one is above the law. Moreover, it articulated two principles
that bear on monetary arrangements. First, government should be divided into
separate parts capable of counterbalancing each other. Second, taxation “shall
be levied in our kingdom only by the common counsel of our kingdom.” The
practical working out of these principles required decisions about which part
of government would control and allocate seigniorage.
The Glorious Revolution in 1688 gave Britain its present parliamentary
form of constitutional democracy. The competition between Crown and Parlia-
ment for political power, which Parliament won, was driven in part by religion
and in part by Parliament’s desire to gain secure property rights. The desire
by Parliament to stop the arbitrary seizure of property by the Crown led to
the particular characteristics of British constitutional democracy that inspired
Americans in their Revolution. The exclusive right of Parliament to levy taxes
was especially important.
In the past, some English kings had debased the coinage as a way of
obtaining revenue. Despite protests by Parliament, Henry VIII had regularly
lowered the precious metal content of coins. Debasement of the currency gave
the Crown a source of income independent of Parliament. After the Glorious
Revolution, Parliament took over the Mint to foreclose debasement as a source
of revenue. When Parliament incorporated the Bank of England in 1694, it
prohibited the Bank from lending to the Crown without Parliament’s consent.
American Revolution
John Locke was the philosopher of the Glorious Revolution. He understood the
two major incentives to the arbitrary exercise of power: the seizure of political
power and the seizure of property. Locke ([1690] 1986, p. 180) wrote that
men “join in society with others . . . for the mutual preservation of their lives,
liberties, and . . . property.”
Locke included popular consent to taxes as a natural right. That principle,
expressed in the phrase “No Taxation without Representation,” became the ral-
lying cry of the American Revolution. The Declaration of Rights in the Virginia
state constitution, written by George Mason and adopted in 1776, states that
“men . . . cannot be taxed or deprived of their property for publick uses, without
their own consent, or that of their representatives so elected” (Commager 1962,48 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
p. 104). In the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson listed as one of
the “repeated injuries and usurpations” of King George his assent to “imposing
Taxes on us without our Consent.”
The arbitrary seizure of property by the British Crown became a major
factor precipitating the American Revolution. James Otis denounced writs of
assistance, which gave the Crown’s agents broad authority to search houses
and conﬁscate smuggled goods not restricted by “probable ground” or particu-
lar “houses specially named” (Commager 1963, pp. 46–47). The Constitution
provided for the protection of property rights in the Fourth Amendment, which
guaranteed the right of “people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures,” and in the Fifth Amend-
ment, which provided that no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.” As explained below, the writers of
the Constitution viewed monetary arrangements as part of the constitutional
protection of property rights.
3. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS
Abuse of Money Creation under the Articles of Confederation
In the period of the Confederation following the Revolutionary War, actual or
threatened civil disorder in several states, especially Massachusetts, prompted
calls for a convention to create an effective central government. The political
difﬁculty of imposing the excise taxes necessary to pay debts inherited from
the Revolutionary War caused many states to yield to pressure to repay debts
through the issue of paper money. Rhode Island effected a general transfer of
wealth from creditors to debtors through the inﬂationary issue of paper money
combined with legal tender laws forcing creditors to accept paper money rather
than specie. In a number of states, legislators used inﬂation in combination with
price controls to transfer income from creditors, merchants, and large planters
to farmers, debtors, and artisans. On August 7, 1786, James Madison (Rutland
1975, p. 89) wrote:
. . . the States are running mad after paper money, which among other evils
disables them from all contributions of specie for paying public debts, par-
ticularly the foreign one. In Rhode Island a large sum has been struck and
made a tender, and a severe penalty imposed on any attempt to discriminate
between it and coin. The consequence is that provisions are withheld from the
Market, the Shops shut up—a general distress and tumultuous meetings.
In a letter to Jefferson, Madison complained about the “warfare & retalia-
tion” that arose among states due to laws allowing citizens of one state to pay
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Federalist essay 10 (Beloff 1987, p. 47), Madison expressed his famous idea
that in a large republic “a greater variety of parties [would militate] against
the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest.” One
reason was that in a large republic “a rage for paper money, for an abolition of
debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked
project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the union, than a particular
member of it” (Beloff 1987, p. 47).
The 1786 disturbance in Massachusetts called Shay’s Rebellion acted as
a catalyst for the convening of a Constitutional Convention. Armed farmers
closed courts to prevent foreclosures on properties for tax delinquency and
threatened to march on Boston to force passage of easy money legislation.
Such threats prompted the Constitutional Convention to protect property rights
by prohibiting states from issuing paper money, from making legal tender laws,
and from impairing the obligation of contracts. In Federalist essay 44 (Beloff
1987, p. 227), Madison defended the Constitution’s prohibition of the issuance
of paper money (then called bills of credit) by the states:
The extension of the prohibition to bills of credit must give pleasure to every
citizen in proportion to his love of justice and his knowledge of the true
springs of public prosperity. The loss which America has sustained since the
peace from the pestilent effects of paper money on the necessary conﬁdence
between man and man; on the necessary conﬁdence in the public councils;
on the industry and morals of the people, and on the character of republican
government, constitutes an enormous debt against the states.
Jefferson believed that the Constitution denied to Congress the “power of
making paper money or anything else a legal tender” (Lipscomb 1903, p. 65).
He wrote that paper money “is liable to be abused, has been, is, and forever
will be abused, in every country in which it is permitted” (Ford 1898, p. 416).
The historian Jack Rakove (1996, p. 44) argues that Madison formulated his
views on constitutional government in response to the arbitrary redistributions
of wealth caused by the paper money inﬂations and legal tender laws of the
states in the Articles of Confederation period.
Limiting the Power of Government to Seize Property Arbitrarily
The Founding Fathers carefully balanced the need for government to raise
revenue with the need to protect private property from arbitrary seizure. They
did so by entrusting ﬁscal policy to Congress, which by design encourages
open debate.3 That debate allows for the monitoring that gives substance to
3 Congress is composed of a large number of members. There are two houses of Congress,
each with its own subcommittees, committees, and rules committee. In order to become law, a
bill must pass through all these individual centers of power. Along the way, a bill can be killed by
a ﬁlibuster. A bill must also go through a conference committee to reconcile differences between
each house of Congress and then survive a possible presidential veto. This convoluted struc-
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the principle that sovereignty resides with the people. Tax legislation must
originate in the House, whose members are elected every two years. No funds
can be spent by the other branches of government without explicit authorization
by Congress. Article I, Section 9, of the Constitution states, “No money shall
be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by
law; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of
all public money shall be published from time to time.” Article I, Section 8,
enforces congressional control of ﬁscal policy by allowing only Congress “to
borrow money on the credit of the United States.” To enforce the separation
of powers, however, a different branch of government, the Executive Branch,
spends the revenues raised by Congress.
In Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, the Founding Fathers assigned
to Congress the responsibility “to coin money, regulate the value thereof.” By
assigning to Congress the responsibility to determine the metallic content of
coins, they prevented the President from following the example of European
kings and debasing the currency. Article I, Section 10, prohibited state gov-
ernments from printing paper money. Taken together with Article I, Section
8, the Founding Fathers put the country on a specie standard. In this way, the
authors of the Constitution sought to limit the ability of government to abrogate
contracts by taking actions affecting the price level.
Monetary arrangements were part of the initial constitutional framework.
By removing money creation and the determination of the price level from the
political process, the Founders limited the ability of government to purposefully
redistribute wealth through inﬂation and inﬂation combined with price controls.
Those same restrictions also protected property rights by preventing recourse
by the government to the unlegislated tax of inﬂation.
However, the specie standard ultimately did not survive as part of the
constitutional framework. At times, the specie standard allowed for inﬂation
or deﬂation and was itself a source of instability. A mandate from Congress to
the Fed to stabilize the price level would possess the advantage of the specie
standard of eliminating discretionary control over the price level. It would
complement other protections afforded property rights. At the same time, such
a mandate would avoid the instabilities of the specie standard.
The argument for a rule requiring the Fed to stabilize the price level is not
one of original constitutional intent. And it is not a legal argument about the
constitutionality of discretionary as opposed to rule-based monetary arrange-
ments. The Constitution does not require government to stabilize the price level.
Money is not a capital “C” constitutional issue involving a legal interpretation
of the Constitution.
generated by the multistep procedure of requiring repeated majorities among groups with widely
differing self-interests generates news and thus supplies the information citizens need to monitor
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However, the Constitution does provide broadly for the protection of prop-
erty rights. A mandate from Congress to the Fed requiring price-level stabiliza-
tion would buttress that broad constitutional protection. Such a rule is desirable
for the same reason that rules in general are desirable in a constitutional democ-
racy: to constrain the arbitrary exercise of power by government. In this sense,
the sense used here, money is a small “c” constitutional issue referring to a
form of government where rules limit government power. (See the Appendix
for a brief history of money and the Constitution.)
4. THE MODERN EXPERIMENT
Although monetary arrangements have disappeared as part of the constitutional
order, Congress remains constitutionally responsible for the value of the dollar.
While it has delegated that responsibility to the Fed, it has done so without
clear instructions on the desirable behavior of the price level.
The Inﬂation of the 1970s
In the 1960s and 1970s, the combination of pressures to make the economy
grow rapidly and a belief that inﬂation arose from factors unrelated to money
growth caused the Fed to pursue an inﬂationary monetary policy. Inﬂation
generated an unlegislated transfer of resources to the government through an
increase in seigniorage. More important than seigniorage, inﬂation generated
government revenue through its interaction with a tax code not indexed for
inﬂation. The arbitrary redistributions of wealth due to the inﬂation of this
period recall the earlier experience of the Articles of Confederation period.
Prior to indexing of the personal income tax brackets and exemptions in
1985, inﬂation combined with progressive tax rates to push individuals into
higher tax brackets. With inﬂation, capital gains taxes still fall not only on the
real gains from selling an asset, but also on the paper gains that compensate for
inﬂation. In addition, inﬂation raises corporate tax rates by lowering the real
value of historical depreciation costs and by raising the measured, but not real,
proﬁts on holdings of inventories. Inﬂation also erodes the value of the estate
tax exemption. (See Feldstein [1996] and the Appendix in Hetzel [1990].) The
interaction of inﬂation and a tax code speciﬁed in current dollar terms created
enormous uncertainty and distortions in the 1970s. Corporations favored short-
term over long-term investment. Investors shifted capital out of the corporate
sector and into real estate in response to the effective rise in corporate tax rates.
Inﬂation allowed a shadow ﬁscal system where the combination of inﬂa-
tion and price controls transferred income to politically inﬂuential groups. Such
transfers were not subject to the safeguards provided by the public discussion
that accompanies explicit legislation to impose a tax. The housing industry
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that depository institutions could pay on savings and small-denomination time
deposits. As a result, when inﬂation rose above Regulation Q ceilings, savers of
modest means received negative returns. Wealthy investors were unaffected as
they could invest directly in money market assets whose yields incorporated an
inﬂation premium. By not allowing the usury ceilings on the interest rates paid
on loans to rise with inﬂation, state governments discriminated against savers.
Rent controls, especially in New York and California, appropriated the wealth
of apartment owners. Price controls on domestically produced oil, instituted as
part of the Nixon price controls in early 1974 but kept until the early 1980s,
rewarded small, politically inﬂuential reﬁners.
Inﬂation and Scapegoating
When discussing the costs of inﬂation, economists concentrate on economic
costs, such as the increased number of trips individuals make to the bank to
economize on the holding of cash balances. The actual experience with the
inﬂation of the 1960s and 1970s, however, demonstrated that the problems
created by inﬂation can extend beyond the purely economic.
Inﬂation threatened the dispersion of power characteristic of the U.S. po-
litical system. It did so by creating a demand for immediate action to deal with
a problem that could only be solved through a long period of perseverance
and patience. Moreover, inﬂation created an incentive for the political system
to identify scapegoats and to deal peremptorily with them in ways that eroded
institutional safeguards to individual liberty. The resulting divisiveness came
on top of other divisive forces in American society arising from the Vietnam
War and the Civil Rights Movement.
Maintenance of the effective dispersion of power called for in the Con-
stitution requires avoidance of the politics of scapegoating. The reason is that
the politics of scapegoating creates a demand for a strong leader who will
loosen institutional constraints so as to be able to deal decisively with the
offending minority. People tend to rationalize impersonal, threatening forces
seemingly beyond their control by blaming them on the actions of identiﬁable
minority groups. The rise of inﬂation in the late 1960s appeared as such a force.
Inﬂation added to the forces in the early 1970s that caused the middle class to
feel besieged by hostile forces beyond its control. The resulting appeal of the
politics of wage and price controls encouraged a majority to blame a minority
for inﬂation.
The origin of inﬂation lay in the high rate of growth money created by the
Fed. The political system, however, desirous of using monetary policy to pro-
mote rapid growth, found it advantageous to exploit the public’s presumption
that private parties create inﬂation through the exploitation of monopoly power.
That presumption led to a demand for wage and price controls. The controls,
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government had to prevent organized groups from selﬁshly demanding unrea-
sonable shares of national income. The controls allowed government to make
scapegoats of organized labor, large corporations, and sectors of the economy
with politically sensitive prices such as food processors.
The combination of inﬂation with a ﬁxed exchange rate created an over-
valued dollar, trade deﬁcits, and a demand for protectionism. The political
system then took advantage of worker resentment over imports and fears of
job losses to scapegoat foreigners. In the early 1970s, criticism of Japan became
a staple of the American political scene. To provide political balance for wage
controls, which were unpopular with leaders of organized labor, the Nixon
Administration imposed a surcharge on imports. Although popular with labor,
the unilateral adoption by America of an openly protectionist trade measure
threatened to precipitate a trade war and reversed the long-standing American
support for a multilateral system of world trade.4
The price controls of the 1970s were an extreme manifestation of the so-
cial costs of inﬂation. However, any time there is inﬂation, there is a political
4 The complexity of economic activity made inevitable the exercise of discretion in applying
the wage and price controls. That discretion allowed the arbitrary exercise of power by government
bureaucracy over individuals. During the initial freeze following the announcement of controls,
even individuals selling personal items in yard sales had to document the sale price of similar
items to avoid transgressing the law.
Because of the difﬁculty of policing a large complex economy and because of the need to
maintain political support, controls required widespread popular support. Popular support required
the appearance of fairness. For this reason, the controls entailed all kinds of destructive interven-
tion in the economy unrelated to the behavior of the price level. For example, unions demanded
controls on interest and dividends. The general public demanded limitation on proﬁt margins. The
government used the threat of IRS audits of proﬁt margins to inﬂuence the price setting behavior
of corporations. The ideal in a constitutional democracy of limited government power enforced
through due process disappeared in the populist clamor to deal with powerful corporations and
unions.
Political pressures existed to make the controls permanent. The controls did not become
permanent in part because of the hostility of the Ford Administration and in part because they
did not work to prevent inﬂation. Without of course intending to, the Fed discredited them by
pursuing an inﬂationary monetary policy. If it had not, however, the public could have seen the
controls as working and they might have become a permanent feature of government control of
large corporations. Price controls on oil, which lasted through 1981, almost became permanent.
Those controls created an energy “shortage” and prevented America from producing the oil that
would have broken the OPEC price cartel. The resulting artiﬁcially high price of oil exercised
an important inﬂuence on international politics. American price controls meant that the Soviet
Union, one of the largest world producers of oil, and the oil-producing countries in the Middle
East gained the resources necessary to exercise signiﬁcant power on the world scene.
Price controls criminalize socially useful activity. Inevitably, more and more individuals ﬁnd
themselves breaking the law and staying out of the criminal system only through the forbearance
of a price control bureaucracy. The government can prosecute a large fraction of the population
at will or in response to political pressures to deal with an unpopular group. Controls erode the
general acceptance of law that allows a free society to function with a minimum of state coercion.
The average citizen is law abiding because he assumes most other citizens are also law abiding.
However, controls create the opposite presumption, that is, everyone else is breaking the law.54 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
incentive to impose attenuated forms of controls through government price
ﬁxing. That incentive arises from pressures on the political system to ﬁnd
ways to redistribute wealth that do not require explicitly voted taxes. Although
the effects of inﬂation interacting with price controls in individual markets are
of a different magnitude from general controls, the corrosive effects are the
same. Individual vice (circumventing the laws that ﬁx prices) becomes public
virtue. And respect for the rule of law erodes. (See Friedman in U.S. Congress,
6/21/73, p. 136.)
Bringing Monetary Arrangements into a Constitutional Framework
The contribution of inﬂation to the polarization of society and politics in the
1970s argues for bringing monetary policy into the constitutional framework
in a way that limits the ability of the central bank to inﬂate. Congress has not
established guidance for what constitutes desirable behavior of the price level.
Although the Federal Reserve Act instructs the Fed to pursue “stable prices,” it
also instructs the Fed to pursue “maximum employment” (Federal Reserve Act,
Section 2A). In practice, the absence of any instruction on how to combine the
pursuit of both these objectives has meant the lack of a meaningful mandate
for the behavior of the price level. The rise in the price level by a factor greater
than six between 1950 and 1995 amply demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the
formal mandate.
A congressional mandate to the Fed for price stability would provide an
institutional safeguard against a recurrence of the divisive experience with in-
ﬂation in the 1960s and the 1970s. The more clearly stated the mandate, the
more understandable it would be to the public. Also, public opinion rallies
more easily behind a simple mandate. The clarity of a mandate to stabilize the
price level as opposed to the vagueness of a mandate to target a “low” rate of
inﬂation means that the former would be more likely than the latter to become
a permanent part of U.S. institutional arrangements.
5. SEIGNIORAGE AND THE CONSTITUTIONALLY
MANDATED BUDGET PROCESS
Seigniorage as a Nonlegislated Tax
Money creation possesses implications not only for inﬂation, but also for the
level of taxation by transferring resources to the government.5 Moreover, money
5 For example, in 1974 (quarterly average CPI) inﬂation was 12.1 percent. Hetzel (1990, p.
53) estimates that federal government revenue was 17 percent higher than it would have been
with price stability. Much of the increased government revenue derived from the lack of indexing
of the tax code for inﬂation. The personal income part of the tax code was indexed for inﬂation in
1985. By reducing the incentive of government to inﬂate, that indexing constituted an important
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creation allows government to obtain resources without imposing an explicit
tax. Milton Friedman (1978, p. 27) wrote:
Since time immemorial, the major source of inﬂation has been the sovereign’s
attempt to acquire resources to wage war, to construct monuments, or for other
purposes. Inﬂation has been irresistibly attractive to sovereigns because it is
a hidden tax that at ﬁrst appears painless or even pleasant, and, above all,
because it is a tax that can be imposed without speciﬁc legislation. It is truly
taxation without representation.
The seigniorage from money creation has implications for the U.S. consti-
tutional system of limited government because of its potential for removing
ﬁscal policy from the recorded budget voted on by Congress. The way the
central bank handles seigniorage raises fundamental constitutional issues about
openness and the separation of powers in government.
As part of the separation of powers, the Constitution assigns to Congress
the power to tax and appropriate funds. As an institutional safeguard to keep
ﬁscal policy in the hands of Congress, the Founding Fathers assigned control
over the specie content of currency, and thus seigniorage, to Congress. Institu-
tional arrangements legislated in the Federal Reserve Act also attempt to assure
that the government will not use money creation to evade the constitutional
requirement that Congress vote explicitly on taxes and appropriations.
These latter arrangements possess two aspects. One is to prevent the po-
litical system from making use of money creation as an unlegislated tax. The
Federal Reserve Act (Section 14: Open Market Operations, (b)(1)) authorizes
Fed banks “to buy and sell in the open market . . . any obligation . . . of the
United States.” The phrase “in the open market” implies that the monetization
that occurs when the Fed purchases debt should be undertaken solely to advance
monetary policy objectives rather than to alleviate the ﬁscal problems of the
Treasury. Speciﬁcally, the Fed should not buy Treasury debt directly from the
Treasury. It should not use the power of the printing press on request to turn
government debt into money. This aspect of independence concerns the size of
the Fed’s asset portfolio, the quantity of money, and ultimately the price level.
The second aspect of institutional arrangements designed to assure the con-
duct of ﬁscal policy through the public acts of Congress concerns the Fed policy
of transferring to the Treasury the income from the securities it holds (after
meeting its operating expenses and paying the statutory dividend to member
banks). In this way, the revenue from money creation appears as government
revenue. Consequently, that revenue can only be spent as part of the regular
appropriations process. Seigniorage revenue must be spent in ways that are
voted on by Congress and that appear on budget. As explained below, this
aspect of independence concerns the composition of the Fed’s asset portfolio.
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The Federal Reserve’s Fiscal Powers
The Fed creates money by purchasing securities from the public. The seignior-
age value to the government is measured by the reduction in the stock of
securities held by the (nonFed) public or, equivalently, the increase in the stock
of securities in the Fed’s portfolio. For bookkeeping purposes, the value of this
seigniorage is measured by the ﬂow of interest payments paid on the securi-
ties in the Fed’s portfolio. These bookkeeping arrangements are the heart of
the institutional arrangements that support Fed independence. The Fed achieves
budgetary autonomy from the political system by allocating to itself the amount
of interest it needs to meet its expenses. The remainder counts as tax receipts
of the government.
As part of the bookkeeping arrangements that buttress its independence,
government accounts treat the Fed as a member of the public. In order to
measure accurately the ﬁscal policy actions of the government, however, the
balance sheets of both the Treasury and the Fed should be consolidated. The
reason is that the Fed turns over to the Treasury the interest it receives on the
government securities it holds (above its costs). As far as the government is
concerned, interest paid on securities held by the Fed is essentially a wash. For
the purposes of ﬁscal policy, the key implication is that it makes no difference
whether the Treasury or the Fed sells a security. Either way, there is an increase
in the debt on which the federal government must pay interest ﬁnanced by some
future increase in taxes or reduction in expenditure. In short, the Fed, like the
Treasury, can take ﬁscal policy actions. Consider the following examples.
Examples of Federal Reserve Fiscal Policy
The Fed could make discount window loans to an insolvent bank. For example,
in 1984 Fed loans to Continental Illinois Bank amounted to somewhat more
than $7 billion, 85 percent of the bank’s uninsured deposits. In conjunction
with such lending, the Fed sells government securities from its portfolio to
keep money and the price level unchanged. That is, it engages in a pure ﬁscal
policy action with no consequences for monetary policy. Government debt in
the hands of the (nonFed) public rises. Control over the composition of its asset
portfolio gives the Fed the ability to engage in ﬁscal policy; in this case, it is in
the form of credit allocation.6 (See Goodfriend and King [1988] and Schwartz
[1992].)
Consider next the direct monetization of Treasury assets that occurs when
the Fed acquires assets from the Treasury’s Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF).
6 The credit allocation arises because of the nonmarket allocation of funds. In this example,
the Fed also transfers the liability for the insolvency from the uninsured depositors to the FDIC.
Because the premiums that banks pay to the FDIC go into general federal government revenues
and because the disbursements of the FDIC are government expenditures, the Fed transfers the
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These assets take the form either of SDRs or foreign exchange.7 When the Fed
acquires assets from the ESF, it credits the Treasury’s deposit account at the
New York Fed. When the Treasury draws down its newly acquired deposits, the
revenues of the banking system increase. The Fed then sells U.S. government
securities out of its portfolio to offset that increase. The net result is to sub-
stitute either an SDR or an asset denominated in foreign exchange for a U.S.
government security in the Fed’s portfolio.8 Government securities held by the
(nonFed) public rise, and the Fed ﬁnances the activities of the ESF—foreign
exchange intervention and lending to foreign countries.
As a ﬁnal example, consider a swap between the Fed and a foreign central
bank. For example, in a swap with the central bank of Mexico, the Fed accepts
peso deposits in exchange for dollar deposits. The Fed invests the pesos in a
peso-denominated security. When Mexico spends the dollars it receives, bank
reserves in the United States increase. The Fed then sells a U.S. government
security out of its portfolio to offset that increase. The net result is to substi-
tute a peso-denominated security for a U.S. government security in the Fed’s
portfolio. Government securities held by the (nonFed) public rise. And the Fed
lends funds to Mexico.9
7 The International Monetary Fund periodically allocates to member countries special draw-
ing rights (SDRs), which the ESF carries as assets.
8 In 1988 and 1989, the U.S. Treasury and the Fed engaged in coordinated sterilized foreign
exchange intervention with other central banks to counter strength in the dollar. In December
1987, the mark/dollar exchange rate was 1.6. In May 1988, the yen/dollar exchange rate was
125. By September 1989, the value of the dollar had risen so that 1.95 marks exchanged for
one dollar and the 145 yen for one dollar. In 1989, the administration became concerned about
the appreciation of the dollar given a large U.S. current account deﬁcit. As a consequence, the
administration and the Fed began sterilized purchases of marks and yen.
The Fed and the ESF divided their purchases of yen and marks. When the ESF ran out of
dollars to sell, it obtained additional dollars from the Fed both through warehousing and through
monetizing the SDRs it held. In 1989, the Fed’s foreign-exchange-related transactions added about
$23 billion to reserves. That was more than the additions to currency that year, and the Fed sold
on net about $10 billion in government securities.
The SDRs on the books of the Fed increased from $5.0 billion at the end of 1988 to $8.5
billion at the end of 1989. In 1989, Fed warehousing of foreign currencies for the Treasury rose
from zero to $7 billion. Fed monetization of the SDRs held by the ESF increases the ESF’s
assets permanently as the ESF uses the dollars it acquires to acquire interest-bearing assets. (See
Schwartz [1997], especially Table 1.)
Figures on SDRs are from the Fed’s balance sheet reported in the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
Figures on Fed warehousing are from quarterly reports, “Treasury and Federal Reserve Foreign
Exchange Operations,” in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review.
Broaddus and Goodfriend (1995) criticize such interventions for sending contradictory sig-
nals about the stance of monetary policy. In this case, the dollar was strengthening because the
FOMC had raised its funds rate peg to almost 10 percent in May 1989 to contain a rise in
inﬂation. By selling dollars to weaken the foreign exchange value of the dollar, the FOMC was
sending an opposite message about the desired stance of monetary policy from what it was sending
domestically by raising the funds rate. Kaminsky and Lewis (1996) make the same point.
9 For example, in September 1989, Mexico drew on its swap line with the Fed for $784.1
million dollars. At the same time, it drew on an ESF swap line for $384.1 million. Figures on58 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
The Fed established swap lines with foreign central banks in 1962 to defend
the ﬁxed exchange rate system without raising interest rates (Hetzel 1996). The
collapse of the ﬁxed rate system in spring 1973 eliminated the original rationale
for swaps. The Fed, however, put them to another use. For instance, in 1973,
the administration asked the Fed to help Italy deal with the increase in its
balance of payments deﬁcit in the aftermath of the large rise in oil prices. “The
Federal Reserve . . . came to the aid of Italy, whose chronic political instability
prevented rapid response to the energy crisis. The central bank expanded its
swap line with the Bank of Italy from $2 billion to $3 billion to help that
country ﬁnance imports in the short run” (Wells 1994, p. 125).
The use of swaps to provide short-term assistance to foreign countries
prompted a debate within the Federal Open Market Committee. In response
to a question from a governor about whether the Fed might provide long-
term assistance to Italy, Chairman Burns (Board of Governors 1974, p. 783)
responded:
If the Federal Reserve were to abandon the principle that the swap lines were
available only to meet short-term needs, there would be a natural tendency for
other agencies of Government to look to the System, rather than to Congress,
for the resources to deal with a broad variety of international ﬁnancial and
political problems. If the System were to provide those resources it would, in
effect, be substituting its own authority for that of the Congress. A decisive
case could then be made in support of the charge that the System was using
Federal moneys without regard to the intent of the Congress.
Limiting the Federal Reserve’s Ability to take Fiscal Actions
Congress has delegated to the Fed the right to exercise the public monopoly on
the creation of money. Through creation of money, the Fed acquires a portfolio
of government securities. Although this portfolio arises out of the conduct of
monetary policy, it allows the Fed to undertake ﬁscal policy actions independent
of Congress, as illustrated above.
Fiscal policy actions taken by the Fed are not subject to the open public
debate generated by congressional actions. Therefore, they limit the govern-
ment accountability that is encouraged by the free ﬂow of information. The
Fed should avoid ﬁscal policy actions not integrally related to its monetary
responsibilities. A restriction that permitted the Fed to hold only government
securities and to acquire them only in the open market would achieve this result.
swap line drawings are from quarterly reports, “Treasury and Federal Reserve Foreign Exchange
Operations,” in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review.
The Fed does not lose interest on the assets in its portfolio as it receives interest on the
peso-denominated assets. The basic point is that the Fed can engage in the loan transaction with
Mexico because of its control over seigniorage. That is, the ability to create and extinguish ﬁat
money allows it to purchase peso-denominated assets.R. L. Hetzel: Monetary Rule in a Constitutional Democracy 59
Fed independence would then complement the constitutional provision: “No
money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations
made by law.”
On the most general level, the issue is preservation of the constitutional
safeguards that give content to popular sovereignty. Those safeguards facili-
tate the monitoring of government by the public. Because inﬂation imposes
an unlegislated tax, discretionary control of inﬂation reduces the monitoring
ability of the public. Also, the use of seigniorage revenues by the central bank
for purposes other than ﬁnancing its own operation reduces the public’s ability
to monitor government activities by limiting public discussion. If the use of
the central bank’s seigniorage revenues is directed by the Executive Branch, it
erodes the separation of powers provided for in the Constitution.
6. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Balancing Independence and Accountability
Central bank independence can help to prevent monetary policy from becoming
subservient to ﬁscal policy. Preventing that subservience is an important part
of facilitating the monitoring of government by the public. A central bank ulti-
mately controls only money creation. A legislative mandate for price stability
would limit political pressure to use money creation to achieve goals that may
be socially desirable but beyond the reach of a central bank. Although money
creation does not create real resources, it can impose a tax. A price rule would
help keep government ﬁnance honest.
An independent central bank also needs to be accountable. The Fed chair-
man does testify regularly before congressional committees. However, there is a
tension between the accountability provided by congressional oversight and Fed
independence. The budgetary beneﬁts of a strong economy have, in the past,
encouraged some congressmen to pressure the Fed for low interest rates and, in
effect, inﬂationary money growth. A mandate requiring the Fed to stabilize the
price level would minimize this pressure, enhance independence, and provide
a clear standard with which Congress could assess the Fed’s performance.10
In a democracy, the legitimacy of central bank independence must rest on
a public belief that the central bank is accountable. That belief derives from
open debate encouraged by a transparency of the objectives of monetary policy.
Independence combined with discretion impairs accountability and encourages
political pressures that threaten the Fed’s independence. Independence com-
bined within a rule mandating price stability would balance independence and
accountability.
10 A mandate to stabilize the price level is not a complete rule unless accompanied by an
explicit strategy. If Congress were to impose such a mandate, it would probably allow the Fed to
select the strategy but require it to make that strategy explicit.60 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Rule of Law, Not Men
The Constitution originally provided for a commodity monetary standard. In
doing so, it restricted the power of government signiﬁcantly: the government
could not manipulate the price level. In the twentieth century, the disappear-
ance of the international gold standard that began with World War I led to a
ﬁat money standard. The long, painful process of learning how to manage a ﬁat
currency, where government sets the price level, has inﬂuenced signiﬁcantly
the history of the twentieth century (Friedman and Schwartz 1963; Goodfriend
1997).
At present, monetary arrangements are working well. However, monetary
policy depends too much on the good luck of having wise policymakers. Wide-
spread public support for a clear rule to guide the conduct of monetary policy
would provide for a continuation of the current period of monetary stability. The
major disasters of monetary policy in the twentieth century—the depression of
the 1930s and the inﬂation of the 1970s—derived largely from a lack of public
understanding that the central bank is responsible for the price level. A mandate
clearly assigning responsibility for the price level to the Fed and requiring the
Fed to stabilize the price level would prevent future major mistakes in monetary
policy.
A rule that required the Fed to stabilize the price level and that eliminated
its discretion over the use of seigniorage by requiring it to hold only govern-
ment securities in its portfolio would complement the constitutional framework
that constrains the exercise of government power. Such a rule would protect the
public from the arbitrary redistributions of wealth that accompany unanticipated
inﬂation and the interaction of sustained inﬂation with price controls. It would
also prevent the political system from imposing an unlegislated tax in the form
of inﬂation and assure that seigniorage is spent only as part of the congressional
appropriations process.
The balance between rules and discretion in the exercise of power by
government is the central issue in a constitutional democracy. That issue is
also central to the design of a country’s monetary institutions. Monetary in-
stitutions should be based on rules that are thought of as part of the broad
constitutional framework. To protect property rights and the ability of citizens
to monitor government, those rules should constrain the use of seigniorage and
the recourse to an inﬂation tax.R. L. Hetzel: Monetary Rule in a Constitutional Democracy 61
APPENDIX : A BRIEF HISTORY OF MONEY
AND THE CONSTITUTION
At the Constitutional Convention, members frequently cited the issuance of
paper money by the states as a major abuse of power by government and a
source of civil discord. For example, Governor Morris (Farrand 1911, Vol. 2,
p. 299) talked about “the history of paper emissions . . . with all the distressing
effects (of such measures) before their eyes.” Madison (Farrand 1911, Vol. 1,
p. 317) stated:
He considered the emissions of paper money . . . as also aggressions. The
States relatively to one another being each of them either Debtor or Creditor;
The Creditor States must suffer unjustly from every emission by the debtor
States. We have seen retaliating acts on this subject which threatened danger
not to the harmony only, but the tranquillity of the Union.
In making the case for the checks and balances of a federal form of gov-
ernment, James Madison and others pointed to the overissue of paper money
as an example of abuse of unrestrained government power. Madison (Farrand
1911, Vol. 1, pp. 134–36; Vol. 2, pp. 76–77) argued that the principal reasons
for a national government were to provide
. . . for the security of private rights, and the steady dispensation of justice.
Interferences with these were evils which had more perhaps than anything
else produced this convention. . . . All civilized Societies would be divided
into different Sects, Factions, & interests, as they happen to consist of rich &
poor, debtors and creditors. . . . In all cases where a majority are united by a
common interest or passion, the rights of the minority are in danger. . . . We
have seen the mere distinction of colour made in the most enlightened period
of time, a ground of the most oppressive dominion ever exercised by man
over man. . . . The only remedy is to enlarge the sphere, & thereby divide the
community into so great a number of interests & parties that in the 1st place
a majority will not be likely at the same moment to have a common interest
separate from that of the whole or of the minority; and in the 2d. place, that
in case they shd. have such an interest, they may not be apt to unite in the
pursuit of it.
Emissions of paper money, largesses to the people—a remission of debts
and similar measures, will at sometimes be popular, and will be pushed for
that reason. . . . it is necessary to introduce such a balance of powers and
interests, as will guarantee the provisions on paper. Instead therefore of con-
tenting ourselves with laying down the Theory in the Constitution that each
department ought to be separate & distinct, it was proposed to add a defensive
power to each which should maintain the Theory in practice.
Alexander Hamilton (Farrand 1911, Vol. 1, p. 288) argued:
In every community where industry is encouraged, there will be a division of
it into the few & the many. Hence separate interests will arise. There will be62 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
debtors & Creditors &c. Give all power to the many, they will oppress the
few. Give all power to the few they will oppress the many. Both therefore
ought to have power, that each may defend itself agst. the other. To the want
of this check we owe our paper money.
Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress had the power to “emit
bills of credit,” that is, issue paper money. Governor Morris moved to omit
that power from the powers assigned to Congress by the Constitution. Several
delegates objected:
Col Mason had doubts on the subject. . . . Though he had a mortal hatred to
paper money, yet as he could not foresee all emergencies, he was unwilling
to tie the hands of the Legislature. He observed that the late war could not
have been carried on had such a prohibition existed.
Mr. Randolph, notwithstanding his antipathy to paper money, could not agree
to strike out the words, as he could not foresee all the occasions that might
arise.
In opposition,
Mr. Elseworth thought this a favorable moment to shut and bar the door
against paper money. The mischiefs of the various experiments which had
been made were now fresh in the public mind and had excited the disgust of
all the respectable part of America. By withholding the power from the new
Governt. more friends of inﬂuence would be gained to it than by almost any
thing else—Paper money can in no case be necessary—Give the Government
credit, and other resources will offer—The power may do harm, never good.
Mr. Wilson. It will have a most salutary inﬂuence on the credit of
the U. States to remove the possibility of paper money. This expedient can
never succeed whilst its mischiefs are remembered. And as long as it can be
resorted to, it will be a bar to other resources.
Mr. Butler . . . was urgent for disarming the Government of such
a power. . . . Mr. Read thought the words, if not struck out, would
be as alarming as the mark of the Beast in Revelations.
(Farrand 1911, Vol. 2, pp. 309–11.)
On the vote to omit “and emit bills of credit” from the Constitution, that
is, to give Congress the power to issue paper money, nine of the delegates
voted in favor and two voted against. In a later letter to Timothy Pickering,
Robert Morris, who had been a delegate, wrote, “Propositions to countenance
the issue of paper money, and the consequent violation of contracts, must
have met with all the opposition I could make. . . . to the best of my recollec-
tion, this was the only part which passed without cavil” (Farrand 1911, Vol. 3,
p. 419).
In 1862, Congress ﬁrst authorized the issuance of paper money as legal ten-
der (Greenbacks) as an expedient means of ﬁnancing the Civil War. Timberlake
(1993, p. 143) wrote:R. L. Hetzel: Monetary Rule in a Constitutional Democracy 63
Up until the time of the Civil War, almost no one had seriously considered
interpreting the money clauses in the Constitution in any light except that of
prohibiting state and federal issues of currency on the basis of discretionary
authority. “To coin money” meant to provide the technical facilities for minting
coins. “Regulate the value thereof” meant only to specify a weight of ﬁne gold
or silver as equal to a number of the units of account, which were dollars.
Eventually, however, the Supreme Court decided in favor of the constitu-
tionality of Greenbacks and the issuance by the federal government of paper
money. At the time, these legal tender decisions were highly politicized (Tim-
berlake 1993, pp. 133–45). President Grant appointed to the Supreme Court
individuals who favored the constitutionality of Greenbacks as legal tender.
Ultimately, the government issuance of paper money as legal tender was made
inevitable by the change in the prevailing interpretation of the Constitution. The
government’s power to issue paper money became inevitable with the demise
of the view that Congress possesses no power not expressly granted to it by the
Constitution and the emergence of the view that Congress possesses all powers
not explicitly denied to it.
In the ﬁnal legal tender case, Julliard v. Greenman of 1884, the Supreme
Court decided that Congress had the power to issue paper money and make it
legal tender in peacetime as well as wartime (Timberlake 1993, p. 137). The
issuance of paper money then ceased to be a Constitutional issue (capital C)
in the sense of an issue decided by the Supreme Court. It remains, however,
a constitutional issue (small c) because of the role of seigniorage as a tax and
the insecurity of property rights engendered by inﬂation.
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